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The assumptions behind the past ten years of economic and legal reform
in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") have been rooted in the belief that
creation of a legal regulatory mechanism can engender the very institution
which the law has been created to regulate. Although this may sound like a
logical conundrum, Chinese experience has recently confirmed it. For
example, the 1979 Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law' encouraged the creation
of limited liability equity joint ventures between Chinese and foreign
participants where no such entities had existed before the law's promulgation.
Indeed, no company law of general applicability has ever been put forward by
the PRC Government, and only in the past few years have some of the
implications of the term "limited liability" been explicated by the newly
announced General Principles of Civil Law. 2
In general, this experience controverts the usual relationship between
economic and legal change. Over the course of history, legal regulation has
necessarily lagged behind developments in the economic sphere, imposed
when the appearance of or the evolution of certain phenomena has created a
need for it. 3 Much more rarely have legal rules been drafted with a view to
creating wholly new economic institutions which presumably would not
otherwise arise. The problems in the PRC which both engender and explain
this seeming paradox are that the demands of its statist political order will not
allow any new actor to emerge in the economy without explicit authorization
from the state, which only legislation can provide; and, conversely, certain
components of a modern economy require the support of a regulatory
framework to function properly, making the existence of such regulation a
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1. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongwaihezijingyingqiye fa [Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment], promulgated on and effective from
July 8, 1979, translated in I CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. 6-500, at 7,801 (CCH Australia Ltd. ed. 1985)
[hereinafter Joint Venture Law].
2. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minfa tongze (General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of
China,) adopted Apr. 12, 1986, at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress,
effective from January 1, 1987, translated in Gray & Zheng, General Principles of Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China, 34 AM. J. COMp. L. 715 (1986) [hereinafter General Principles]; see also Jones, A
Translation of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 13 REV. SOCIALIST L. 357
(1987).
3. See, e.g., White, Wl'here Do Mtarkets Come From?, 87 AM. J. Soc. 517 (1981) (for the social
background to market formation); see also Joffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1591
(1982) (for a perspective on the socialist economy).
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necessary but not a sufficient condition for their development. Thus, it would
appear that the lack of legal regulation impedes the spontaneous generation
of new economic phenomena, while at the same time the non-existence of
various economic activities renders law for their regulation supererogatory.
The practical problem, I suggest, for the Chinese government leader is:
Shall he await manifestations of economic behavior which require legislative
control before legislating, or shall he attempt to legislate new economic
arrangements into existence? Although the first sequence of events fits the
historical model better, the present Chinese political order renders it rather
futile. The second sequence better comports with political realities, but is it a
feasible way to proceed economically? In the specific examples which are
examined below, recent legislative enactments will be examined to determine
how well Chinese law has succeeded in inducing change in the economy.
II
Due to the undeveloped and rapidly evolving nature of Chinese financial
markets4 and-more important to this inquiry-the laws and regulations
which govern them 5 it is probably premature to address the topic at this time.
Students of the Chinese legal system outside of the PRC since 1949 have,
however, learned to extrapolate from limited data about certain social
phenomena; the risks of such an enterprise are obvious, and often we have
miscalculated grossly. 6 Nonetheless, the recent emergence of the PRC from
its self-imposed isolation, the quantity of information about Chinese society
which has become available to scholars outside of China over the past ten
years, and the general direction of policy pronouncements at the highest
levels of Communist Party and state leadership have emboldened
commentators on the current scene to speak with greater assurance.
The area of financial regulation falls within this paradigm; much
information-legal and otherwise-has recently become available about it,
and the development intended for Chinese financial markets by the PRC
leadership has become increasingly apparent. While the final contours of the
emerging Chinese financial system remain unclear, significant features have
begun to appear. This paper will focus on two of these features-reform of
the banking system and creation of securities markets-as well as on the
discrete regulations affecting them as a means of examining the relationship
between legal regulation and economic development in the PRC. Beyond the
mere description of the specific regulations examined, this inquiry will
attempt to adduce some general points for analysis of the parallel reform of
4. Yu, China's Financial Market, CHINA TRADE NEWS, June 1, 1987, at 7.
5. See Part III infra and Sobel & Zhang, The Evolution of Foreign Secured Lending in China: Socialism
and Property, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 185 and App.
6. See, e.g., Chu, Banking and Finance in the China Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE
LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 343 (Moser 2d ed. 1987); Conroy & Moser, Selected Legal
Aspects of Financing Transactions with the People's Republic of China, id. at 380. See generally GHADAR,
FINANCING THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1987). See, e.g.. Cohen, The Year of the Law and End of
Arbitrary Courts, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Oct. 5, 1979.
[Vol. 52: No. 3
BACKWARDS INTO THE FUTURE
China's legal and economic systems in pursuance of the general goals of the
current PRC modernization program. 7 Although it is somewhat beyond the
scope of this paper, the range of legal and non-legal considerations which
promote wider reliance on market forces will be considered insofar as they
relate to regulation of financial markets.
For both foreign and Chinese observers of the various changes which have
taken place in China over the years since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Communist Party Congress in December 1978,8 one of the most interesting
developments has been the emergence of financial markets.9 Despite the fact
that these have yet to achieve the range and sophistication of the long-
established markets of more economically developed countries, the very fact
of their existence is remarkable to some; others more familiar with China's
recent development are impressed with the extent of their evolution from
rather inauspicious beginnings in the late 1970's.10 In parallel with the
appearance of these economic activities, legislative enactments have appeared
to encourage and to facilitate, as well as to regulate, these emerging
markets. ' '
The necessity for capital markets became abundantly clear to leading
figures in Chinese economic circles shortly after the momentous changes
began in the late 1970's to open China to the outside and to reinvigorate
China's then-stagnant domestic economy.' 2 Rather than follow the former
policy of channeling all investment decisions through the state planning
process, merely earmarking funds for enterprises to be dispensed through the
People's Bank of China, it was recommended that various activities to raise
funds from society-at all levels, from both units and individuals-should be
not only permitted but also encouraged.' 3 Moreover, as economic reforms
7. For a similar series of developments in the agricultural sector, see Zweig, Hartford,
Feinerman & Deng, Law, Contracts, and Economic Modernization: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural
Reforms, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319 (1987).
8. See Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the
Communist Party (Dec. 18, 22, 1978), Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, Oct.-Dec. 1978, 77 CHINA
Q. 172 (March 1979).
9. Tarling, China's New Banking System, INT'L FINANCIAL L. REV. 32 Uuly 1985); JETRO [Japan
External Trade Organizationi Shanghai Office, Reforms in the Shanghai Financial System, 71 CHINA
NEWSLETrER 19 (1986).
10. See Chu, supra note 5, at 374 (concluding that banking and financial transactions with China
have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years and that they should become somewhat easier
to conclude as China develops its legal system and gains experience in international finance).
11. A recent multi-volume compendium of Chinese commercial laws lists at least 35 laws and
regulations in the area of "Banking and Finance." See 1 SIT, COMMERCIAL LAWS & BUSINESS
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1983 & sub. vols.).
12. Chen, Bank of China Charts Progress, BEIJING REV. 36 (Mar. 14-20, 1988); Shang, Financial
Reform in China, CHINA TRADE NEWS 5 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 4:
We should not only improve and develop a commodity market, but also open up a financial
market accordingly. We know that the primary goal of the monetary policy of the central
bank is to regulate and control the macroeconomy so as to tighten control without
sacrificing invigoration of the economy. Therefore, we must promote the important banking
intermediaries and must also set up other financial intermediaries for gradually creating
prerequisites adapted to the needs for financing economic development.
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began to show some success, particularly in the rural agricultural sector, the
supply of and demand for funds both mushroomed.' 4 A greater share of
decisionmaking authority about funding devolved in the early 1980's to lower
level units and local governments, but at the same time there were fears that
unregulated fundraising activity might hinder the flow of funds to the most
productive investments and also result in occasional losses to investors. At
both the national and local government levels, there were concerns about
controlling the issuance of shares and bonds by enterprises and other units
which produced a certain amount of legal regulation. 15
Significantly, while these economic developments were occurring all over
China, an important debate was being pursued among the Chinese leadership
about the basic nature of ownership in Chinese society and about the
advisability of encouraging shareholding and other forms of private or quasi-
private ownership of the means of production in a socialist country.' 6
Notwithstanding a tiny, but vocal, minority who opposed any form of such
ownership in China,' 7 the debate in large part engaged two bigger factions
which only disputed the extent to which such forms of ownership should be
encouraged.' 8 At the present time, it appears that a limited amount of share-
and bond-holding will be permitted but that there is still no agreement as to
the percentage of an enterprise's value which might be opened to "public"
ownership.' 9 As recently as four or five years ago, in the pages of the
[After interim regulations of the People's Bank of China permitting interbank loans were
promulgated in 1986,] [nlon-bank credit institutions also began to participate in the
interbank loan market. The rural and urban credit cooperatives generally join the banks'
market of the same city, while the trust and investment corporations with operations
covering broader territories may grant loans to or be granted loans from parties in other
cities or provinces. In 1986 an interbank urban loan market of 16 urban credit cooperatives
was established in Wuhan.
14. See, e.g., Xie, Bank Starts Network to Ease Funds'Flow, China Daily, Mar. 17, 1987, at 2; Wang &
Ding, Interview with Chen Muhua, President of the People's Bank of China, Wen hui bao, Mar. 28, 1987 at 4,
translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service ("FBIS") Daily Report: China, Apr. 3, 1987, at
K23.
15. Su, Stock Market Talk Along the Bund, China Daily, Mar. 9, 1985, at 4; Note, Shareholding:
Possibilities, BEIJING REV., No. 19, May 12, 1986, at 22. See also Brevetti, Shanghai Stock Exchange Share
Fully ,Subscribed, South China Morning Post, Oct. 30, 1986, at 1 (1400 local companies have issued
stock, but only two had already received approval from the People's Bank of China to sell on the
Shanghai Exchange).
16. Dong, More on the Forms of Socialist Ownership in China, JINGJI YANJIU (EcON. RES.), No. 4, Apr.
20, 1985, at 3, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, June 13, 1985, at K6 (individual and collective
ownership should be widened at the expense of state ownership of the means of production to
unleash productive forces in connection with reform of the economic structure of China).
17. See, e.g., Xiao, A Decade of Ownership Study and Reform in Retrospect, QIUSHI (SEEKING TRUTH),
No. 11, Dec. 1, 1988, at 22, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Jan. 17, 1989, at 45; see also He,
The Shareholding System Is Not the Orientation for State Enterprise Reform, Guangming ribao (Enlightenment
Daily), Oct. 17, 1987, at 3, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Oct. 29, 1987, at 38 (because China
is a socialist country, it should not encourage enterprises to issue shares nor their staff or workers to
purchase them).
18. See, e.g., Wu, Shareholding Is Not the Orientation of the Reform of Large- and Medium-Sized State
Entesprises, Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Mar. 16, 1987, at 5, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China,
Mar. 25, 1987, at K20; see also Zheng, Securities Regulation in China: Development and Conflicts, E. ASIAN
ExEc. REP., May 1987, at 7.
19. Note, supra note 15:
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newspaper China Daily,20 two important figures, Zhou Jiayuan, Deputy
Director of the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China, and Xie Zongqiang,
Assistant General Manager of the Shanghai Investment and Trust
Corporation, agreed that it would be difficult to reopen a stock exchange in
Shanghai and that "there won't be any market of this kind within three or four
years." 2' Among the problems they raised were the need for a legal
framework for securities trading and enterprise bankruptcy, 22 as well as
limitations to prevent speculation.
The subsequent opening of markets in Shanghai, as well as in Shenyang,
Wuhan, and elsewhere in China (the New York Times believes 23 Beijing,
Tianjin, and Harbin as well), has proven Zhou and Xie partially wrong in their
predictions. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the newly opened
"stock exchanges" are not full-fledged markets by any definition. The
number of issues traded is small; in many cases, most of the trading is in
bonds and not shares. 24 Moreover, in an article published in March 1987, the
official People's Daily stated that trading shares would "not [be] compatible
with socialist materialist civilization," since shareholders would think only of
the economic advantage of their own companies, rather than of the nation as a
whole.2 5
One of the first bond-trading centers to open in China, in the northeastern
industrial city of Shenyang, proposed at the outset a set of simple rules which
would provide the rudiments of transferability and liquidity along with
safeguards against speculation and other sharp practices.2 6 Bondholders
were to be allowed to trade bonds, an important concession since many early
issues of both shares and bonds contained restrictions on their transfer.2 7
Given these problems in introducing shareholding in China, the state should hold the
greatest number of shares. Legally, the state is entitled to own the major share of the means
of production. The state shareholders, through their representatives on the boards of
directors, participate in the decision-making of the enterprises so as to protect the interests
of the state as property proprietors and also ensure that the state does not interfere in the
day-to-day management of the enterprises.
20. Su, supra note 15. Both Xie and Zhou point out that presently [sic] there is only a limited
number of qualified shares and stocks and public stock trading is hardly possible. "But once stocks
increase in number, things might change," they admitted.
21. Id.
22. Id. It should be noted that a bankruptcy law has been promulgated in China since the date
of this article and has gone into force following the enactment of "The Law Concerning State
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People of the People's Republic of China" (adopted Apr. 13, 1988)
(effective Aug. 1, 1988) (promulgated by the First Session of the Seventh National People's
Congress). See The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted on Dec.
2, 1986) (effective Nov. 1, 1988), translated in 19 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 733 (1986).
23. China Opens Fifth Market, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1987, at D6.
24. Id. The markets, which mostly trade bonds, have yet to handle company shares along the
lines of stock exchanges in the West. This impression was reinforced by the promulgation of interim
regulations on bonds, but no comparable enactment with respect to shares, in March 1987. See
Interim Regulations on the Administration of Enterprise Bonds (promulgated by the State Council
on Mar. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Interim Regulations], translated in CHINA DAILY Bus. WEEKLY, Apr. 22,
1987. at 3.
25. See Wu, supra note 18.
26. Fung, Securities .Market Slated to Open in China's Northeast, Asian Wall St.J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 16.
27. Id.
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Trading, however, would have to be done through the auspices of the
Shenyang Trust and Investment Company. 28 Interest rates on bond issues 29
were also subject to a ceiling of 20 percent above the rates for fixed bank
deposits with the same maturity. In Shanghai and other financial markets,
monitoring of the issuance of shares by the very first enterprises allowed to
sell shares on the new exchanges was effected through the People's Bank of
China, by using the powers of the Industrial and Commercial Bank to
supervise the management and financing of industrial and commercial
enterprises. 30
Since they did not similarly entail thorny questions about ownership, the
reforms of the Chinese banking system to replace appropriations for all
enterprises and construction projects included in the state plan with bank
loans met with far less resistance. Nonetheless, production units accustomed
to "eating from the big pot" by receiving annual appropriations regardless of
their productivity or sales success were reported to be reluctant to adjust to
the new system. 3' Measures had to be adopted to compel the switchover and
to reassure the hesitant about the terms for loan repayments.
Nor have the changes in China's banking system been any less dramatic
than the reforms which gave rise to the fledgling stock markets. The
separation of the monolithic People's Bank of China into several components,
including a truly supervisory central bank as well as specialized operating
banks, caused some controversy. 32 Even more surprising was the recent re-
establishment of the Bank of Communications as a joint-stock institution, 3
perhaps clearing the way for more financial institutions outside the close
28. Id. Shenyang Trust and Investment Company is supervised by the Shenyang branch of the
People's Bank of China, so the virtual monopoly of the central Chinese bank over financial
transactions would be maintained under such an arrangement.
29. Id. A further feature peculiar to the Shenyang market was that many of them carried cash
prizes, awarded in a lottery fashion, which about 10% of the bondholders received. Top prize for a
bond with face value of 50 yuan was originally to be 20,000 yuan but was later lowered to 8000 yuan
and then to 5000 yuan to forestall criticism that bond purchases were nothing more than legalized
gambling.
The Interim Regulations, supra note 24, eventually set the maximum interest for state enterprise
bonds at 40% of the interest rate for individual time savings accounts at the time of issuance of the
bonds. Interim Regulations, art. 18.
30. Grub & Sudweeks, Securities Markets and the People's Republic of China, CHINA NEWSLETTER, No.
74, 11 (1988).
31. Beijing XINHUA News Release in English, Officials Learn Bank's Role in Economy, 1407 GMT,
Mar. 25, 1987, monitored in FBIS Daily Report: China, Mar. 26, 1987, at K40; see also De Wulf,
Economic Reform in China, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1985, at 8, 11 (noting that a major obstacle to reform
would be adjusting "an economic philosophy that, for many years, has emphasized strict adherence
to egalitarianism and job security rather than economic efficiency.
32. Wilson, How Banks Work in China, THE BANKER, Jan. 1980, at 19. See also State Council Decision
That the People's Bank of China Executes the Exclusive Function As the Central Bank (decision of Sept. 17,
1983), translated in 4 COMMERCIAL LAWS AND Bus. REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(1987). Cf Li, Freeing the Banks From Beying's Grip, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WEEKLY, Nov. 7, 1988, at 13
(central bank is not independent but is directly controlled by the State Council; other banks at
various levels are forced by government to finance pet projects; specialized banks are not responsible
for profits and losses and thus do not worry about risk in their management).
33. Shen, Banking to Rebuild Lost Glory, China Daily Shanghai Focus, Mar. 27, 1989, at 3 (80-year-
old Bank of Communications is China's first shareholding commercial bank with a wider scope of
business, including real estate and insurance, than that of state banks).
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control of the state banking apparatus. At the same time, new financial
instruments have appeared, often in advance of the legislation authorizing
their issuance and delineating their terms.3 4  In addition to shares,
commercial paper, state treasury bonds, and enterprise bonds have all been
publicly offered for sale over the past few years in the PRC.3 5 Both rural and
urban credit cooperatives have been revived and strengthened as the grass-
roots mainstay of China's banking system,3 6 and they provide most of the
credit for the peasant entrepreneurs and individual enterprises who are
creating the new socialist economy with Chinese characteristics. 37 Finally,
more than a hundred non-bank financial institutions38 have opened since
1979, among them national and regional trust and investment companies and
leasing companies offering new avenues for creative financing.3 9
The People's Bank of China, both as central bank and as the entity with the
legal regulatory power over financial institutions, has nominally maintained
control over these developments in finance. Yet as the number and
complexity of institutions and instruments increases, it will likely become
more difficult to keep track of them. Already the need for specialized
knowledge and regulatory mechanisms is becoming clear. 40  In the
foreseeable future it may become necessary for the People's Bank of China to
share some of its authority with the Ministry of Finance or to delegate it to
new bodies, such as a Securities Commission or other entities with a narrower
regulatory mandate and greater resources.
34. See, e.g., Administration of Enterprise Short-Term Financing Debentures: Tentative
Procedures (promulgated by the People's Bank of China, Shanghai Municipality; announced on
December 6, 1987), reported in I CHINA BANKING AND FIN., No. 1, Jan. 25, 1988, at 10 (requiring
enterprises that wish to issue short-term commercial paper to obtain a license from the local
Administration for Industry and Commerce); see also Text, Experts Propose Limit to Nonbanking
Institutions, Beijing CEI Database in English, Aug. 12, 1988, transcribed in FBIS Daily Report: China,
Aug. 15, 1988, at 40 (describing attempts to limit the proliferation of non-bank financial institutions
outside the management and control of the central bank).
35. do Rosario, Borrowing Boom, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14, 1989, at 63 (growing sophistication
and activity in financial markets, at least in Shanghai, even after economic retrenchment of late
1980's).
36. Xie, Bank Starts ,Network To Ease Funds' Flow, China Daily, Mar. 17, 1987, at 2 (national
network of county branches and credit cooperatives handle the work of the Agricultural Bank of
China); Shang, supra note 12 (rapid development of collective and individual businesses led to swift
development of urban credit cooperatives in large- and medium-size cities).
37. Xie, supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Financial Companies Plays [sic] Greater Economic Roles. 9 CHINA
ECON. NEWS, No. 30, Aug. 8, 1988, at 1; see also Regulate Non-bank Institutions, China Daily, Dec. 10,
1988, at 4 (stating that China then had 1790 city credit cooperatives and 730 trust investment
companies, enterprise financial companies, and leasing companies).
39. E.g., CITIC [China International Trust and Investment Corporation] Boosts Capital Base for Expansion,
8 CHINA ECON. NEWS, No. 48, Dec. 14, 1987, at I (bond issuance and borrowing totalled $800 million
in 1987 for CITIC Industrial Bank, CITIC's banking arm); Dai, Banking Monopoly To Be Broken Up,
China Daily, June 3, 1988, at 2 (development bank created in Guangdong Province by bank
shareholders with Hong Kong funding to challenge monopoly of the Guangdong provincial branch
of the People's Bank of China).
40. Shang, supra note 12, at 6 (noting need for improved macro-management by the central
bank, including better management methods at every level and more economic and financial
legislation, as well as better statistical and information networks).
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III
During the past two or three years, there has been a flurry of legislative
activity to create the framework for a system of financial market regulation in
China. Of necessity, this inquiry can focus on only a few of them; I hope that
those chosen will prove illustrative. In the area of securities regulation, the
two sets of regulations under consideration are the Interim Regulations on
the Administration of Enterprise Bonds 4 '-a set of nationwide rules
promulgated by the State Council in March 1987-and the Xiamen Rules on
the Management of Shares and Bonds42 -local rules approved by a provincial
legislature for a single special economic zone. Both share certain features:
encouragement of bond financing in preference to share issuance; limitations
on the face values and interest rates of securities; and entrustment of
administration and interpretation of the laws to the People's Bank of China.
43
The national Interim Regulations on the Administration of Enterprise
Bonds ("Interim Regulations") spell out in some detail the requirements for
issuance of bonds by state-owned enterprises. In thirty articles, divided into
five main parts, the Interim Regulations set forth the current policy of
directing state enterprises to raise funds with bonds and not to sell their
shares to the public;44 one interesting provision, which prohibits compulsory
purchases of bonds,45 suggests that certain enterprises may have been forcing
employees and perhaps other related persons to buy bonds. The People's
Bank of China is established as the administrative organ for the issuance of
bonds; no bonds can be issued without its approval. 46
Under Part Two of the Interim Regulations, "enterprise bonds" are
defined as negotiable securities issued by enterprises on the basis of legal
procedures with fixed provisions for payment of interest and repayment of
principal. 47 The Interim Regulations list which terms are required to be
stated on the face of the bonds48 and state that the People's Bank should
41. Interim Regulations, supra note 24.
42. Xiamen's Rules on Management of Shares and Bonds (effective Sept. 1, 1986), 7 CHINA
ECON. NEWS, No. 43, Nov. 24, 1986 [hereinafter Xiamen Rules].
43. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 29; Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, art. 27 (although
the responsibility was vested in the Xiamen Branch of the People's Bank of China).
44. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 8 (holders are entitled to payment of interest and
repayment of principal but do not have the right to participate in management of the enterprise) and
art. 9 (holders are not to be held responsible for the business of the enterprise). Also, in comparison
to the Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, which expressly encompass both bonds and shares, the Interim
Regulations are limited to bonds.
45. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 3. The issuance for purchase of enterprise bonds
should abide by the principles of voluntary participation, mutual benefit, and payment. Compulsory
purchase of bonds is banned in enterprise bond issues.
46. Id. art. 4. Chapter Three, "Administration of Enterprise Bonds," explains in detail the
process whereby the People's Bank of China approves the issuance of bonds.
47. Id. art. 5. "Negotiability" is nowhere defined in the Chinese legal lexicon, but some solace
may be afforded the investor in bonds, at least, by the General Principles, supra note 2, art. 90: "A
lawful loan relationship is protected by law.'"
48. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 6 (including the enterprise name and address, the
bond's face value and interest rate, maturity, means of payment of principal and interest, serial
number, seal of ihe enterprise, and proof of approval by a proper administrative organ).
(Vol. 52: No. 3
BACKWARDS INTO THE FUTURE
approve the form of such bonds. 49 Several articles provide the basic features
of Chinese bonds: bondholders have no voice in an enterprise's
management; 50 are not liable for the enterprise's business (nor, presumably,
for its losses); 5' and may transfer, mortgage, or bequeath their bonds. 52
The section of the Interim Regulations on administration 53 provides that,
within the framework of centralized administration of the economy, the
People's Bank of China shall work out quotas for issuances of bonds on a
national basis. Enterprises issuing bonds are required to "announce" certain
matters, including facts about their management, use of funds raised, means
of repayment of the bonds, and so on. 54 Furthermore, enterprises applying to
issue bonds must file various materials with the People's Bank of China, such
as a business license, upper level approvals, and financial reports. 55 Total
value of the bond issue may not exceed the enterprise's net asset value;56 the
interest rate on the bonds may not exceed 40 percent of the bank rate for
individual savings at the time of issuance. 57 An interesting provision allows
enterprises to issue bonds themselves or to use an agent, who may charge a
commission; these agents have no liability for the business of the enterprises
which hire them. 58 Only banks and other institutions authorized by the
People's Bank of China may handle transfer, issuance, and other transactions
involving bonds. 59 The People's Bank is authorized to inspect and to examine
the use of funds by enterprises which have issued bonds and by enterprises
which have purchased bonds. 60
Legal responsibility for administering sanctions against those who violate
the Interim Regulations rests with the People's Bank.6' These sanctions
range from freezing the funds raised by the bond issue to a fine of 5 percent
of the funds illegally raised. 62 Individuals responsible for violations of the
49. Id. art. 7.
50. Id. art. 8.
51. Id. art. 9.
52. Id. art. 10.
53. Id. Chapter Three, "Administration of Enterprise Bonds," arts. 12-24.
54. Id. art. 14.
55. Id. art. 15. These materials may be filed with the People's Bank of China or with its
branches. In addition to the items listed, art. 15, A-F, enterprises may also be requested to submit
"other materials required by the People's Bank of China." Id. art. 15, G.
56. Id. art. 16. It should be noted that the Interim Regulations nowhere define such accounting
terms as "net value of the assets of the enterprise."
57. Id. art. 18.
58. Id. art. 21:
Enterprises can issue bonds by themselves or entrust banks or other financial institutions to
issue bonds for them as agents. The agent institutions can charge a certain amount of
commission on the basis of the total value of bonds they issue as agents. The agent
institutions do not bear any responsibility for the business status of the enterprise which
makes the entrustment.
59. Id. arts. 22 (banks and other specialized institutions approved by the People's Bank can
handle transfer) and 23 (non-financial institutions and individual citizens cannot handle issuance and
transfer).
60. Id. art. 24.
61. Id. art. 25 (with respect to violations of Interim Regulations, arts. 3, 4, 7, 1I, 15, and 17).
62. 1d. art. 25, A-D. The punishments of art. 25 may be implemented concurrently.
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Interim Regulations may be subject to administrative disciplinary action as
well as to economic penalties. 6 3 Supplementary provisions of the Interim
Regulations grant the right to interpret the Regulations to the People's Bank
of China, along with the responsibility for drafting implementation
regulations. 64
The Xiamen Rules on Management of Shares and Bonds ("Xiamen
Rules") resemble the Interim Regulations in broad outline, although they
apply to issuance of shares as well as of bonds. 65 They present rules for the
raising of funds for enterprises in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone, rules
which apply to state-owned, collectively owned, and foreign-owned
enterprises issuing stock or bonds in Xiamen.6 6 The characteristics of shares
are detailed: 6 7 Shareholders are allowed to participate in the enterprise's
management, receive dividends, and bear liability for losses up to the value of
their shares' capital. 68 Small state-owned enterprises, along with other sorts
of enterprises, are allowed to issue shares; by negative implication, larger
state-owned enterprises most likely cannot.6 9 The value of shares issued shall
not exceed the enterprise's net asset worth, 70 and shares are registered with
perpetual duration, except for certain "fixed-term" shares. 7'
Shares are classed as collective or individual, depending upon who buys
them; the rights and benefits of shareholders are the same regardless of
classification. 72 Shares may either pay out dividends or pay dividends and
interest.73 They can be sold, transferred, inherited, or used as security for
loans.7 4  Upon dissolution or bankruptcy of an enterprise, shareholders
63. Id. art. 28.
64. Id. art. 29.
65. Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, art. 2:
State-owned, collectively-owned, domestic associated enterprises, as well as enterprises
involving foreign investment (i.e., joint venture, cooperative, and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises) desiring to raise capital through the issuance of shares and bonds shall be
governed by the present regulations. (emphasis supplied)
66. Id.
67. Id. Chapter Two, "Shares."
68. Id. art. 3.
69. Id. art. 4:
All small state-owned enterprises, urban and rural collectively owned enterprises, joint
enterprises of various economic forms, and enterprises involving foreign investment which
are economic entities enjoying the status of a legal person are allowed to issue shares for
subscription by other enterprises, institutions, and individuals.
70. Id. art. 5. Here the "net worth of existing assets" is defined as the "total value of fixed assets
and circulating capital after deducting depreciation and borrowed capital."
71. Id. Fixed-term shareholders are not allowed to participate in the management of the
business operations of the enterprise but otherwise enjoy all the rights and benefits, and bear the
same responsibilities, as do other shareholders under the provisions of the Xiamen Rules, art. 3,
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. Id. art. 7:
Shares subscribed by enterprises and institutions are collective shares and those subscribed
by individuals are individual shares.
73. Id. art. 8.
74. Id. art. 9.
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receive distributions of the remaining assets (after paying taxes, wages, and
debts) according to their proportion of share ownership. 75
The provisions regarding bonds under the Xiamen Rules 76 follow the
national Interim Regulations but contain local standards for maximum
interest rates. 77 A special provision 78 permits enterprises to sell bonds only to
their staff and workers for certain purposes; such bonds may contain
restrictions on their transfer. 79 The Xiamen Rules also contain general rules
about management, issuance, and purchase of shares and bonds.80 As with
the Interim Regulations, the issuance must be supervised and approved by the
People's Bank of China.8 ' Certain documents, including business licenses,
higher level approvals, prospectuses describing use of funds, and financial
statements must be submitted.8 2 Involuntary subscriptions are forbidden, 3
and party cadres and military men are not permitted to purchase bonds or
shares.8 4 The Xiamen Rules encourage the issuance of shares and bonds
outside of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone, particularly in Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macao.8 5
Agents, who may charge commissions, can be entrusted to handle the
issuance of shares and bonds; as under the Interim Regulations, their liability
75. Id. art. 10. Note that the Xiamen Rules, art. 10, provide that "after the promulgation of the
bankruptcy laws, matters on this regard will follow the new provisions." Hence, since November
1988, this article has been superseded by provisions of The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the
People's Republic of China, supra note 22, art. 37:
After paying off the bankrupt expenses, the bankrupt estate will be liquidated in accordance
with the following order:
(i) the employees' wages and the expenses of the labor insurance the bankrupt
enterprise owes;
(ii) taxes the bankrupt enterprise owes;
(iii) bankrupt claims.
Where the bankrupt estate does not suffice to satisfy all the claims in the same order, the
distributions will be pro rata.
76. Id. Chapter Three, "Bonds."
77. Id. art. 15 (30% plus interest at rates offered by banks for savings deposits for the same time
limit).
78. Id. art. 16.
79. Id. (bonds may be transferable but transferees are restricted to staff and workers of the
enterprise concerned).
80. Id. Chapter Four, "Management, Issuance, and Purchasing of Shares and Bonds."
81. Id. art. 17:
Public issuance of shares and bonds by enterprises is to be managed, examined, and
approved by the Xiamen branch of the People's Bank of China.
82. Id. art. 18.
83. Id. art. 19. Presumably this is meant to prevent enterprises from forcing employees,
suppliers, and others to purchase their securities.
84. Id. These prohibitions are in line with longstanding policies to preserve the ideological
purity of Party and army members as well as to prevent improper entanglement by those who wield
particular powers in economic decisionmaking.
85. Id. art. 20:
Shares and bonds can be issued outside the Xiamen Special Economic Zone and to other
areas of the country. Fellow countrymen in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, as well as
overseas Chinese, may subscribe in accordance with the present Regulations shares and
bonds publicly issued in the Xiamen Municipality.
Indeed, one of the unstated purposes of these rules seems to be to solicit funds for development
within the Xiamen Special Economic Zone from Taiwan and Hong Kong compatriots as well as from
other overseas Chinese.
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for the business of the enterprise is limited.8 6 Unlike the Interim Regulations,
the Xiamen Rules allow any unspecified financial agent to handle transfer and
change of ownership of shares and bonds.8 7 Spot transactions are used to
establish prices for securities under the Xiamen Rules.8 8 Interpretation
remains the responsibility of the People's Bank, although under the Xiamen
Rules it is the Xiamen Branch of the People's Bank of China which undertakes
to interpret the rules.8 9
IV
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
As can be seen, these two recent sets of rules can only begin to establish
the framework for a complete system of financial regulation which may
eventually emerge in the People's Republic of China. Many difficult questions
remain to be settled, among them the capacity of state-owned enterprises to
issue shares90  and the practical effect of liquidity-limiting provisions
regarding transfer of securities. 9 1 In the area of banking law, the role of the
specialized banks, 9 2 the status and validity of new financial instruments, 93 and
the powers of the non-bank financial institutions9 4 all present new challenges
for regulatory authorities.
In the long term, it is likely that both enterprises and investors may raise
questions about the obvious conflict of interest arising by virtue of the
86. Id. art. 22.
87. Id. (referring only to "financial agents"); cf. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 21,
which refers to "banks or other financial institutions," and art. 22, which requires approval from the
People's Bank of China for 16 specialized banks and other financial institutions to handle transfer
transactions of enterprise bonds.
88. Id. art. 23.
89. Id. art. 26.
90. The Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, and parallel regulations issued in Guangdong Province,
Interim Procedures of Guangdong Province for the Administration of Stocks and Bonds (adopted
October 10, 1986, and effective from the date of promulgation), translated in Texts, People's Republic of
China-Section A, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., May, 1987, at 22, suggest that stock ownership as well as bond
purchase is encouraged by the economic reform faction in the People's Republic of China. Yet the
limitation of the Interim Regulations, supra note 24, strictly to bonds argues that the difficult
problems a socialist regime confronts when stock is involved with questions of ownership have not
been resolved.
91. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, arts. 22 and 23; Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, arts. 16
and 22.
92. See, e.g., Kristof, Chinese Bank Is an Anomaly, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1987, at DI:
The state-run Bank of China, for example, is reportedly unhappy that Citic will open a
commercial bank this month called the Citic Industrial Bank, which can deal in foreign
exchange and will challenge the Bank of China on its own turf.
93. See, e.g., Beijing XINHUA in English, Bonds To Be Issued JWith Index-Linked Interest, monitored i
FBIS Daily Report: China, June 27, 1989:
StartingJuly 1, China will issue government bonds worth 12 billion yuan this year, with the
interest rate pegged to the price rise index, according to a recent State Council circular.
94. See, e.g., Regulate .\on-bank Institutions, China Daily, Dec. 10, 1988 (non-bank financial
institutions have taken a great deal of funds from specialized banks and used circulating funds for
fixed asset investment by paying higher than bank interest rates).
BACKWARDS INTO THE FUTURE
People's Bank of China's dual role. 95 Not only does it control the banks which
make loans to Chinese enterprises; it also controls those enterprises' access to
other parts of the capital market. In part, this conflict may be inadvertent, a
result of the newness of many sectors of the market and the paucity of trained
personnel. Over the next several years, the direction taken by China's
financial regulators should become more apparent. 96 In addition, the power
given to the People's Bank of China to interpret the very rules governing
securities markets seems problematic, should serious disputes arise.97
Perhaps there will eventually appear, as in the United States98 and other
countries with active financial markets, 99 independent agencies with a special
mandate for regulations and no particular interest in the process other than to
uphold standards of honesty and fair dealing.
For the time being, it remains to be seen whether China's experiment in
liberalizing its financial markets will have the desired results. Recent statistics
suggest that China's financial markets are expanding rapidly,' 00 with
widespread activity in a number of sectors. The long-term benefits of this
change insure that these comments can serve only as an introduction to a field
of legislation which will most certainly grow. It also awaits further
developments to see whether China's unique forms of legal and economic
engineering can, in fact, induce lasting changes.
In the light of current political developments in China, however, it may be
appropriate to ask whether the necessary stability to assure rational economic
actors about the predictability of outcomes and security of transactions exists
in the PRC. The continued debate, in the contexts of both theory and
practice, about the nature of ownership makes objective observers outside
China skeptical that financial markets can weather political storms. As
recently as January 1989,101 it seemed that ten years' study of questions of
ownership and its relationship to economic reform had resulted in a
breakthrough which would permit coexistence of various forms of ownership
alongside state ownership. The shortcomings evident in state-owned
enterprises had led a large number of economists and state government
officials to believe that other forms of ownership would likely induce needed
95. As both central bank, with regulatory power over the financial markets, and as an operating
bank controlling competing financial institutions. See, e.g., Shang, supra note 12.
96. See, e.g., Symposium, China's New Initiatives in Developing Financial Relations, CHINA TRADE
NEws, Apr. 15, 1987, at 6.
97. Interim Regulations, supra note 24, art. 29; Xiamen Rules, supra note 42, art. 26.
98. The Securities and Exchange Commission, an independent agency of the federal
government, is composed of five members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Not more than three Commissioners may be members of the same political party. The
term of one Commissioner expires each year. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sec. 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d.
99. Cf. United Kingdom (Bank of England oversight and self-regulation), Japan (independent
agency modeled on United States Securities and Exchange Commission, with Ministry of Finance
involvement), Hong Kong (newly created independent commission).
100. See Capital and Needs Foster Financial Market, China Daily, July 17, 1987 (forecasting 23 billion
yuan of bonds would be sold in long-term money market during 1987).
101. Xiao, .4 Decade of Ownership Study and Reform in Retrospect, QIus"I (SEEKING TRUTH), No. 11,
Dec. I, 1988, at 22-25, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Jan. 17, 1989, at 45.
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changes in the Chinese economy, strengthen the sense of responsibility of
both managers and workers in Chinese enterprises for the operations of their
units, and lead to considerable economic growth. 10 2 Even Karl Marx was
cited as authority for the proposition, applicable to the socialist economy, that
"*the shareholding system can turn the scattered private capital into social
capital and can quickly gather a large amount of funds to do something that
individual capital cannot accomplish." 1 0 3
Yet developments in three important aspects of the Chinese economy
since the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989 call into question the possibility
that such reforms can continue on the same trajectory as before. Basic
questions of ownership, the ongoing process of enterprise reform, and the
particular institution of shareholding all appear to be threatened by a very
marked change in the political atmosphere in China over the past half year.
Unless there is a definitive re-assertion of the economic reform imperative
which predominated in government and academic circles in recent years, all of
the developments thus far may be overturned. For example, as to the nature
of ownership in the PRC, recent articles suggest that "privatization" is now
under attack. The argument is that unless socialist public ownership is
upheld, privatization of ownership through recent reforms such as selling
shares in public enterprises may lead to "undermining the root of socialism
and turning socialism into capitalism."' 10 4 Indeed, the selling of shares in
existing public enterprises has been labelled "tantamount to
[mis]appropriating public property."10 5
Such reversion to an earlier mode of economic analysis is one result of the
new enforcement of political orthodoxy after the Tiananmen Massacre.
Insofar as dangerous new ideas such as "privatization" and the new-found
self-assurance of a financially independent group of small producers and
entrepreneurs have been held to be responsible for the demonstrations which
disrupted China during the spring of 1989, they are now being renounced as
"capitalist" or "bourgeois." Only collectivized forms of ownership are now
held to ensure the welfare of the broad masses of workers and to guarantee
that they will not be exploited by a new class of "owners" who would be the
sole group to profit from privatization. 10 6
Similarly, enterprise reforms begun during the 1980's which sought to
give managers greater control of production decisions and worker efficiency,
along with the arguments for reform which had stressed the backwardness of
Chinese industry, are now both being downplayed. The new wisdom is that
socialist public ownership has been strikingly successful in certain showcase
industries and enterprises, at least as measured by net output value and
102. Id.
103. Id. at 49.
104. Guan, Is Privatization the Way Out for China?, QUNYAN (THE MASSES), No. 8, Aug. 7, 1989, at
10-13, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Sept. 13, 1989, at 36.
105. Id.
106. Zhou, Comment on the Ideological Trend of Privatization, Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 4,
1989, at 6, translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Sept. 22, 1989, at 31.
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annual growth rates. io7 Thus, the support which had been carefully built for
significant change in the management of Chinese enterprises has collapsed.
Continuing to urge such reform is now, in itself, indication of wayward
tendencies which will not be tolerated in the aftermath of Tiananmen.
There are obvious and ominous implications for shareholding in this
hardening of attitudes about the correct "line" on economic issues such as
ownership and enterprise reform. First of all, it is possible that the whole
process of selling partial ownership interests in Chinese enterprise will cease.
At the very least, the limited experiments which have thus far been pursued
may be further restricted to a tiny handful of the least attractive, economically
most insignificant entities, in order to stress the primacy of orthodox state
ownership and the marginal status of other forms of ownership. Second, the
whole attitude of the populace about stock and bond ownership is being
altered by the financial exigencies which China is now enduring, in no small
part because of economic losses engendered by the events of last spring. One
very telling report maintains that the Chinese Government is now forcing
workers to accept up to 25 percent of their wages in the form of government
bonds, which essentially constitutes forced borrowing necessitated by a
serious cash shortage in China.' 08 Needless to say, the enthusiasm of such
workers for other such investments will be seriously dampened by these
tactics.
Finally, there is a new riskiness to the very act of owning shares in a rapidly
changing political climate where yesterday's glorious entrepreneurs may
become tomorrow's capitalist exploiters. It is by no means certain that those
who merely followed the government's encouragement to participate in the
restructuring of China's economy a few years ago will be protected from
attack once those experiments fall into disfavor. Those who have not already
purchased shares or bonds are unlikely now to do so; many who dabbled in
the nascent markets may think it wise to unload their securities, should the
opportunity arise, before they are caught by more violent shifts in China's
political winds.
This has not discouraged die-hard economic reformers from continuing to
promote the issuance of stocks and bonds as part of overall financial reforms
in China. One recent article maintains that even in an economy where public
ownership remains the "mainstay," there is a place for security-holding. 0 9
Yet even this advocate of developing financial markets is careful to note that
107. Id. at 33:
Let us take the Shoudu Iron and Steel Complex as an example. During the past 10 years, its
labor productivity calculated on the basis of its net output value has increased by 260
percent, with an average annual growth rate of 13.66 percent. This has been faster than the
increase of labor productivity of large iron and steel enterprises in developed countries. Of
course, such analysis ignores the relative levels of those industries at the beginning of the
comparison period, not to mention such factors as the quality of the output and, the
efficiency of the production processes.
108. Mathews, China Forcing Workers to Accept Government Bonds as Wages, Wash. PostJuly 19, 1989,
at A17.
109. Jin, China's Stock and Bond Market, BEUING REv., Oct. 30 - Nov. 5, 1989, at 24.
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they must develop under the "prerequisites of public ownership and
adherence to socialist orientation."' 10 In fact, a subtle argument emerges that
stock and bond ownership under the "unified control" of the People's Bank of
China may assist the re-assertion of centralized control of the economy by
preventing local government and enterprises from borrowing elsewhere to
expand investment outside the confines of the state plan. I '
Despite this commentator's enthusiasm for developing the stock and bond
markets, he is forced to acknowledge five overarching problems which may
impede progress.' 12 Fixed interest rates for long-term investments are all the
same, regardless of considerations of variable risk of their issuers;
"administrative apportionment" interferes with market allocation of newly
issued bonds and the secondary market; few intermediaries exist in China to
facilitate transactions in securities; legal regulation of securities, both their
issuance and their transfer, is "not fully established"; and recordkeeping
methods are extraordinarily backward, in most cases being done by hand.
In the end, whether or not China determines to expand the experiment
with security-holding and the attendant economic reforms or returns to an
earlier model of socialist public ownership, the market will continue to be an
afterthought. Political and programmatic concerns will decide the course and
the speed of progress, with economic phenomena forced to conform to their
dictates, rather than proceeding organically from the natural evolution of a
dynamic economy. The ability of such a system to propel China into
industrial modernity remains problematic.
110. Id.
I11. Id. at 26.
112. Id. at 27.
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